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Abstract
This article examines the education strategy of the Sahrawi 
Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), the state-in-exile with 
partial sovereignty on “borrowed territory” in Algeria . The 
article, which opens with a historical glance at the conflict, 
argues that SADR’s education program not only succeeded 
in fostering self-reliance by developing skilled human 
resources, but was forward looking, using education as a 
vehicle to instill “new traditions of citizenship” and a new 
imagined national community, in preparation for future 
repatriation . In managing refugee camps as provinces of a 
state, the boundaries between the “refugee” as status and 
the “citizen” as a political identity were blurred . However, 
the stalled decolonization process and prolonged exile 
produced new challenges and consequences . Rather than 
using the skilled human resources in an independent state 
of Western Sahara, the state-in-limbo forced SADR and 
the refugees to adapt to a deadlocked conflict, but not 
necessarily with negative outcomes to the national project .
Résumé
Cet article examine la stratégie pour l’éducation de la 
République arabe sahraouie démocratique (RASD), l’État 
en exil ayant une souveraineté partielle sur du « territoire 
emprunté » à l’Algérie . L’article, qui débute par un survol 
historique du conflit, avance que le programme d’éduca-
tion de la RASD non seulement a réussi à favoriser l’auto-
nomie en assurant la formation d’une main-d’œuvre qua-
lifiée, mais a aussi, grâce à une vision orientée vers l’avenir, 
utilisé l’éducation pour instaurer de « nouvelles traditions 
de citoyenneté » et la notion d’une communauté nationale 
renouvelée, en vue d’un futur rapatriement . Par sa gestion 
de camps de réfugiés comme des provinces d’un État, les 
limites entre le statut de « réfugié » et l’identité politique 
du « citoyen » ont été estompées . Toutefois, le processus de 
décolonisation arrêté et l’exil prolongé ont suscité de nou-
veaux défis et diverses conséquences . Plutôt que d’utiliser 
les ressources humaines qualifiées dans un État indépen-
dant du Sahara occidental, l’entre-deux a forcé la RASD et 
les réfugiés à s’adapter en raison d’un conflit arrivé à une 
impasse, mais qui n’a pas nécessairement eu des répercus-
sions négatives sur le projet national .
The prolonged and unresolved conflict in Western Sahara from 1975 to 1991 left thousands of Sahrawi refugees in a barren desert, with little resources and 
few supporters in the region. Remarkably, however, this 
did not hinder them from establishing the institutions 
of a nation-state-in-exile, which they called the Sahrawi 
Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Education has played a 
critical role in building the new polity and society, which is 
the main focus of this article.
The first and second sections provide a brief historical 
sketch, while the third and fourth deal specifically with edu-
cation, its history, and its key role in building human resour-
ces, new “traditions of citizenship,”1 and national identity. 
The last two sections address the changing environment that 
followed the ceasefire in 1991, including the Intifada (upris-
ing) in the Moroccan-occupied territories, and the effects 
these had on SADR and the educated generations. This 
article argues that SADR’s education strategy succeeded in 
producing skilled professionals and in infusing education 
with a nationalist purpose: educated refugees could better 
serve the causes of liberation and nation building. However, 
there were unavoidable impediments, not least the dire 
conditions of exile, which stymied the development of edu-
cational institutions in the camps beyond the elementary 
levels, forcing SADR to outsource education. More crucially, 
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the education strategy did not take into account the pos-
sibility of a protracted exile and political stalemate. Thus, 
new generations of educated youth returned to the camps 
unable to fight at the battle front, or to use their skills as cit-
izens engaged in building an independent Western Sahara. 
Instead, for many refugees, education became a means to 
improve their socio-economic status and to obtain paid 
employment outside the camps. However, these changes did 
not threaten the national project, or indicate that refugees 
abandoned their aspirations for liberation and return.
Most of the information in this article is based on field 
research in the Sahrawi camps and Spain beginning in 
2003. During my visits, which occurred during holidays 
and a sabbatical leave in 2007, I stayed for different periods 
of time with families in all the camps, as well as in Rabouni. 
The methodology included participant-observation, life-
histories, interviews, archival research, and a visit to the 
liberated areas of Western Sahara.
Historical Background
Western Sahara, the last African colony, is listed by the 
United Nations as a Non-Self-Governing Territory.2 It lies 
in the northwest corner of the African continent and is bor-
dered by Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. Its inhabitants 
speak a dialect of Arabic known as Hassaniyya and, until 
the middle of the twentieth century, they relied mainly on 
pastoral-nomadism, seasonal cultivation, trade, and some 
fishing. Day-to-day activities revolved around the freeg, or 
Bedouin camp, a small socio-economic unit that provided 
for the basic needs of its members: shelter, food, educa-
tion, health (traditional medicine).3 Boundaries and pol-
itical identities were redrawn when the Territory became 
“Spanish Sahara” at the Berlin Conference in 1884–85. It 
remained a Spanish colony until February 1976.
Hodges traces the genesis of contemporary Sahrawi 
national consciousness to the latter half of the twentieth 
century. Building on a long history of struggle against col-
onial incursions, and inspired by the national liberation 
movements that swept the colonial world, a number of 
Sahrawi revolutionaries met clandestinely on the 10 May 
1973 and held their first Congress to establish the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de 
Oro (known as the Polisario Front).4 The Front rapidly har-
nessed large-scale support among the indigenous popula-
tion around its strategic objective of national liberation and 
independence. The Polisario aimed to create a new polity 
and not recreate a pre-colonial society; thus it rejected all 
forms of kinship loyalty and caste status, and it called for 
the fair distribution of resources and a commitment to 
women’s emancipation.5
In 1974, Spain, still ruled by the ailing dictator Francisco 
Franco, signaled that its withdrawal from Spanish Sahara 
was imminent and agreed to the principle of self-determin-
ation as the United Nations had been demanding. The fol-
lowing year, a UN Mission of Inquiry visited the Territory 
between 12 and 19 May, and reported back to the UN that 
the indigenous population overwhelmingly supported the 
Polisario and called for independence. The Mission “found 
almost no Saharawis [sic] who favored joining Morocco.”6 
Thus, the Sahrawis thought they were on the verge of cele-
brating their freedom and would soon be voting on their 
political future. However, both Morocco and Mauritania 
made claims of historic pre-colonial sovereignty over the 
Territory and, through the United Nations, requested 
that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provide an 
Advisory Opinion on the matter. On 16 October 1975, the 
ICJ unequivocally concluded it had “not found legal ties 
of such a nature as might affect the application of General 
Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of 
Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-
determination through the free and genuine expression of 
the will of the peoples of the Territory.”7
Defiantly, King Hassan II of Morocco dismissed the 
ICJ’s Advisory Opinion and provoked a crisis when, on 6 
November 1975, he rallied some 350,000 Moroccan vol-
unteers for a “Green March” to converge on the Territory. 
Thousands of unarmed Moroccan civilians carrying Korans 
and banners, choreographed for dramatic effect, gathered 
in Tarfaya, a southwest Moroccan border town.8 The Green 
March, however, was a smokescreen; a week earlier on 31 
October, units from the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces 
had quietly moved into the Territory from the northeast to 
occupy posts evacuated by the Spanish troops.9  
According to Mundy, the crisis in October and 
November of that year meant that Madrid abandoned 
Western (Spanish) Sahara without holding the referen-
dum10 and without resisting the military invasion. Instead, 
on 14 November 1975 Spain surreptitiously negotiated the 
Madrid Accords, which partitioned administrative con-
trol of the Territory between Morocco and Mauritania.11 
The Accords were not recognized by the United Nations 
as granting either Morocco or Mauritania sovereignty 
rights over Western Sahara.12 On 27 February 1976, a day 
after Spanish withdrawal, a Provisional Sahrawi National 
Council formed by the Polisario declared the birth of the 
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in Bir Lehlu, 
a small town in an area reclaimed by the Sahrawi Popular 
Liberation Army (SPLA) during the war.13
The Moroccan and Mauritanian invasion led to an armed 
conflict with the Polisario, which lasted for sixteen years, 
until 1991. By the end of the war, Morocco occupied most 
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of Western Sahara, including the area rich in phosphate, 
minerals, and potential deposits of oil and gas; the major 
towns; and the vibrant fishing industry of the Atlantic 
coast. Mauritania, the weaker of the two occupying coun-
tries, renounced its claims in Western Sahara in 1979, but 
Morocco extended its control to the areas previously occu-
pied by Mauritania. The Polisario fighters were able to keep 
about a fifth of the Territory.
In 1988 Morocco formally signed the Settlement Plan 
brokered by the United Nations and the Organization of 
African Unity (African Union). Thus, a ceasefire came into 
effect in 1991 and a UN force, the United Nations Mission for 
the Referendum in Western Sahara (known as MINURSO, 
the acronym formed from its name in French), was estab-
lished to oversee the repatriation of Sahrawi refugees who 
were to vote in a referendum on their political future.14 The 
referendum was scheduled for 1992, only to be postponed 
several times, (including 1992, 1996, 1998 and 2000) and, 
today, Morocco adamantly refuses to recognize any ref-
erendum that includes the option of independence, still 
claiming Western Sahara falls under its sovereignty.15 The 
Western Sahara conflict glaringly attests to the subjection of 
international law to the will of powerful states, even though 
as Smith observed the right of self-determination for col-
onized peoples, a legal norm binding on all states to support, 
is now “something sui generis, with Palestine and Western 
Sahara being the last, and egregiously stalled, examples.”16
The interests of powerful states illuminate the under-
lying causes of the unresolved conflict.17 Countries like 
Spain and France have thriving economic transactions in 
Morocco, not to mention the co-operation in the domains 
of migration and security. Importantly, Morocco is one of 
the oldest and staunchest allies of the US in the region, and 
more so today in its “war against terror.”
In recent years, the conflict in Western Sahara, which 
the UN recognized as a colonized territory, and its inhabit-
ants as deserving self-determination, has been recast as a 
conflict in which both parties are presumed to have equally 
legitimate negotiable claims.18 For example, Christopher 
Ross, the current UN envoy to Western Sahara, has been 
espousing “negotiations without preconditions.” This strat-
egy has left on the negotiating table two irreconcilable 
stances: Morocco’s sovereignty claims and the Polisario’s 
position that the right to self-determination, including the 
option of independence, is a non-negotiable principle. The 
conflict thus remains deadlocked.
Building the Institutions of a Nation-State  
in Refugee Camps
When the war broke out, Sahrawis initially sought safety 
within Western Sahara in makeshift camps, but these were 
vulnerable to military attacks. In Umm Dreiga, for example, 
the Moroccan Royal Air Force hurled napalm from the skies 
on the civilians gathered there for safety, causing hundreds 
of deaths and mutilations by burning white phosphorous.19 
Sahrawis were thus compelled to cross the border into 
Algeria. The destination was the area around Tindouf, a 
small Algerian town that was a safe haven for refugees and 
guerrilla fighters.
The number of Sahrawi refugees by the end of 1975 is 
estimated to have been between 40,000 and 70,000.20 By 
the end of the war approximately 40 per cent of the popu-
lation of Western Sahara had become refugees. Today, the 
Sahrawi refugees in the camps are estimated at close to 
170,000 people; the rest of the population is distributed 
in the areas of Western Sahara under Moroccan occupa-
tion, Mauritania, the Canary Islands, Morocco (mostly in 
Tarfaya in the south of Morocco), and European countries, 
mainly Spain. SPLA soldiers are stationed in the liberated 
area of Western Sahara, along with a few Bedouin families 
and people in transit.21
Four major camps emerged near Tindouf, and a smaller 
fifth camp developed around a skills-training centre for 
women. Four of the camps are quite close to Tindouf, the 
distance ranging from 20 to 35 kilometres. Al-Dakhla camp 
is the furthest, around 140 kilometres southwest of Rabouni, 
the site for SADR’s political and administrative operations, 
itself about 30 kilometres southeast of Tindouf. However, 
the camps are not a fertile sanctuary, but are located in 
a stretch of unforgiving arid desert known as Lehmada, 
where temperatures hover around 50 degrees Celsius in the 
summer, and it becomes bitterly cold during winter nights. 
Howling winds and sandstorms arrive unpredictably, whip-
ping at tents and mud-brick shelters, causing material dam-
age and health problems. As if this were not enough, in 
some years, heavy torrential rains turn the camps into dis-
aster areas, dissolving the flimsy mud-brick structures and 
knocking down the tent poles.
International humanitarian aid on a large scale did not 
begin until 1977 and refugees struggled to survive the harsh 
environment with scant resources.22 Since most men were 
fighting with the SPLA, women carried the burden of cop-
ing with domestic tasks as well as administering programs 
in the camps. With no electricity and without sufficient 
food, medicine, or water, diseases and malnourishment 
were widespread.23
Despite the harsh environment and scant resources, SADR 
wasted no time building for the future in Western Sahara, 
envisioned as a polity radically distinct from the tribal soci-
ety and ideology of the past. In these camps, the national 
leadership fostered self-management and modern concep-
tions of the nation-state, including equal citizenship.24 
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National belonging was promoted, while tribal allegiances 
were seen as fetters to progress and development.
A constitution was drafted as early as 1976, and it declared 
that SADR’s temporary base was in the refugee camps situ-
ated in Algerian territory ceded to it by the Algerian state 
and in the liberated areas of Western Sahara. SADR estab-
lished ministries, government departments, security and 
police, and an army, the SPLA. It named the camps and the 
administrative subdivisions within them after towns and 
areas in Western Sahara. For example, al-Ayoun, the cap-
ital of Western Sahara, is further divided into al-Dshayra, 
al-Doura, al-Hagouniyyeh, Guelta, Bucraa, and Amgala. 
Similar divisions apply to the camps of Smara, a historical 
city in Western Sahara; Dakhla, a seaport; and Auserd, an 
interior town.
Mirroring the administrative units of sovereign nation-
states,25 the camps are treated as provinces or wilayaat 
(wilaya in the singular), each with its own governor or wali. 
These are subdivided into six or seven districts or dawa’er 
(da’ira, singular) and ahyia’ (hayy, singular), that is, neigh-
bourhoods or municipalities. A museum housing arte-
facts attesting to a nomadic history and traditions crowns 
SADR’s public display as a nation-state.
Each wilaya has an informal market and a number of pub-
lic buildings, including a hospital, local health clinics, six or 
seven elementary schools, and preschool facilities. During 
the war, almost every refugee was active in one committee 
or another at local, regional, and national levels. Local com-
mittees oversee matters relating to education, health, food 
(distribution), justice, and production/artisan projects. At 
the national level, there are two boarding secondary schools 
named 12 October and 9 June, while 27 February26 is the 
name of a women’s skills-training centre (and of the camp 
that developed near it). The centre, initially restricted to 
married women, offered housing and daycare facilities to 
enable women to live with their families while studying. In 
time, many families settled nearby, forming the nucleus of 
what became the 27 February camp. There are also national 
unions for women, workers, and youth. The administrative 
terms such as wilaya (instead of camp) are used in every-
day conversations and in official statements and documents. 
Describing the early years in the wilayaat, Aminatu, a 
woman in her mid-fifties, recalled:
There were campaigns of all kinds. I belonged to the health com-
mittee … Our job was to check the standards of cleanliness in the 
tents … Then there was the Education committee. Women would 
go around the tents, to make sure that the children were doing 
their homework … Every woman was organized in a committee.27
SADR does not have a formal economy, or the finances to 
dispense salaries or wages; those who staff the various pos-
itions are usually Sahrawi volunteers. Although the growth 
of informal markets and the flow of remittances into the 
camps over the past two decades has helped sustain the live-
lihoods of many refugee households, Algerian support and 
international aid remain critical and in fact lacking in the 
areas of nutrition, health, and education.
In addition to Algeria, aid now comes from vari-
ous sources, including the European Commission 
Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), the 
World Food Programme (WFP), and the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Education 
has been subsidized and/or scholarships offered by Algeria, 
Cuba, Syria, Libya (in the case of Libya, the number of stu-
dents and scholarships has dwindled since the mid-1980s), 
and more recently Venezuela. In addition, some Sahrawi 
students receive scholarships to support their education 
from non-profit organizations, especially at the university 
level. Such odd scholarships were granted by organizations 
in Spain, Italy, Germany, Russia, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Bulgaria, Hungary, and France.28
However, the relationship between Sahrawi refugees and 
international humanitarian organizations is distinguished 
from classical models, where refugees are treated as power-
less “beneficiaries.” In the Sahrawi case, SADR acts as a buf-
fer zone or checkpoint: it requires all representatives of such 
organizations to “check in” with the relevant Ministry or 
Department and obtain formal approval for projects and aid 
designated for Sahrawi refugees. In addition, food or other 
aid items are distributed by local Sahrawi refugee commit-
tees according to Sahrawi guidelines. Self-management is 
also buttressed by Algeria, which refrains from intervening 
within SADR’s areas of jurisdiction. SADR issues its own 
passports, which are politically significant, although prac-
tically useless beyond Algeria and a few other countries.
Although the conditions of dispersal resulted in diverse 
contexts and experiences, for example, between the refu-
gees in camps and those under Moroccan occupation, 
the Polisario/SADR is a central unifying political frame-
work, notwithstanding defectors and those who support 
Morocco’s autonomy plan. For example, in November 2003, 
al-Sahra’ al Hurra (The Free Sahara) the main Sahrawi 
monthly publication, included many letters of solidar-
ity and support: from “political prisoners in Moroccan 
prisons,” from “Sahrawi women in the occupied towns of 
Western Sahara,” from the “Sahrawi youth and students in 
the occupied territories,” and from “male and female activ-
ists in the occupied territories and south of Morocco,” salut-
ing the Polisario’s eleventh General Popular Congress held 
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in Tifariti in the liberated zone of Western Sahara, attesting 
to the influence of SADR beyond the camps.29
The wilayaat are not bounded or isolated; in addition to 
the vibrant Tindouf airport which brings visitors, relatives, 
and officials, refugees travel back and forth within and out-
side the wilayaat to the liberated strip of Western Sahara,30 
Mauritania, Canary Islands, Spain, and other countries, 
enabling connections and relationships beyond the bound-
aries of camps.
Building an Educational System in the Desert 
Camps
“University Students: Knowledge in the Service of the 
Cause,”31 the title of a two-page article in al-Sahra’ al-Hurra, 
summarizes SADR’s perspective on education. Indeed, edu-
cation occupies a substantial part of Barnamej al Amal al 
Watani (the Program of National Action), the implementa-
tion of which initiated fundamental changes, so that many 
functions in areas such as education, health, and shelter, 
previously the responsibility of the freeg, were passed on to 
SADR.
SADR, perceiving education as necessary to build the 
modern society, declared education mandatory for males 
and females at the elementary, preparatory, and secondary 
levels.32. The short- and long-term objectives are aimed at 
developing human resources to encourage self-reliance in 
the present and future, to foster national belonging, and to 
instill the idea of citizenship as the bases of the new polity. 
With similar expressions to those I had heard in Palestinian 
refugee camps,33 education was viewed as the means to 
redeem families from poverty and the nation from occupa-
tion. The former has gained more value since the ceasefire 
in the early nineties, while the latter took precedence during 
the war (1975–1991).
Historically, education was achieved through an oral 
tradition transmitted through stories, poetry, and everyday 
conversations about history, religion, and cultural values. 
Children also could acquire what Sahrawis call a “trad-
itional education,” usually from an elderly man in the freeg 
who had mastered the Arabic language (reading, grammar, 
poetry) and the Koran.34
Under Spanish colonialism, few Sahrawis enrolled in 
schools,35 which were built mostly to cater to Spanish set-
tlers, whose number increased in the 1960s when the dis-
covery of phosphate led to a booming industry. As late as 
1975 over 95 per cent of the population was illiterate. The 
language of instruction in the colonial schools was Spanish, 
and the curriculum was void of anything relating to Sahrawi 
society, so some Sahrawis attended al-katateeb (informal 
circles of learning) at mosques where they could acquire 
basic knowledge in their language and religion.
In 1975, the educational and literacy levels were dismal: 
there were only two teachers who had acquired their educa-
tion in Spain, about a dozen trained in the colony for three 
months, one doctor, two male nurses, and thirty-five uni-
versity undergraduates.36 Thus, SADR had few options. In 
the first stage, roughly between 1976 and 1979, the prior-
ity was to launch adult literacy campaigns to teach Arabic, 
the mother tongue of Sahrawis (not taught in the colonial 
schools) and to train Sahrawi teachers. This was made pos-
sible by Algeria, which offered to provide short teacher-
training courses in 1976. SADR also sent children to coun-
tries willing to subsidize their education, which in the 
first few years included education at the elementary levels. 
Algeria became the primary sponsor, but there were others, 
including Libya, Syria, and Cuba, and a smaller number of 
students went elsewhere. Parents were at first reluctant to 
part with their children; however, education free of costs, 
assurances of protection and guidance by SADR, and the 
framing of education as necessary for the national struggle 
eventually convinced them that the sacrifice of separation 
would reap future benefits. Al-Salka, a mother of five living 
in al-Ayoun (wilaya), remembered:
I was very young when they sent us to Libya, maybe I was in grade 
2 … I cried a lot … With time, things got easier and I got used to 
it … We used to come back in the summer, once a year. But educa-
tion was more important for us.37
In the second stage, between 1976 and 1986, a relatively 
effective education system took shape, and a national 
committee was mandated to develop a Sahrawi curricu-
lum. SADR’s Ministry of Education declared Arabic as 
the official language, with Spanish as the second, under-
standably so, considering the century-long Spanish rule in 
Western Sahara. Moreover, declaring Spanish as a second 
language advanced SADR’s view that Western Sahara had 
a distinctive history, different from that of either Morocco 
or Mauritania, where French colonialism had left its traces 
on the language.
As trained teachers began to return to the camps, the 
three national schools were built, namely, the two second-
ary schools (9 June and 12 October) and the women’s train-
ing centre. The reference to “national” indicates that these 
educational institutions are accessible to the national body, 
or to students from all the wilayaat, and not restricted to a 
particular camp or wilaya . During this period, the number 
of elementary schools, preschool facilities, and nurseries in 
the wilayaat and dawa’er increased.
However, two secondary schools have limited capacity; 
therefore, SADR took the decision to send the vast major-
ity of students to complete their secondary and/or tertiary 
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education in other countries, a practice that continues 
to this day. In the meantime, adult literacy campaigns 
were developed and became the responsibility of students 
who completed the preparatory and secondary levels and 
returned to the wilayaat for their summer holidays. The 
reasons behind involving the youth in the literacy pro-
grams were detailed in the Program of National Action, and 
expressed SADR’s nationalist ideology; these included fos-
tering self-reliance, granting the youth a role in raising con-
sciousness in society, and promoting national identity. Thus, 
by the middle of the 1980s, almost all Sahrawi children liv-
ing within SADR’s sovereign territory were attending pre-
school or elementary schools in their wilayaat and dawa’er.
By the third stage, roughly starting in the mid 1980s, 
graduates began to return to the camps to volunteer their 
knowledge and skills in the various political and social 
institutions. They contributed significantly to the principle 
of self-reliance espoused by the Polisario, replacing many 
international practitioners and professionals. Until the 
ceasefire came into effect in 1991, some graduates joined 
the SPLA and fought some of the last battles in the war with 
Morocco. However, as we shall see later, the ceasefire pre-
sented challenges for both SADR and the graduates.
In hindsight, it is evident that SADR and the refugees 
made qualitative leaps in the field of education. However, 
these achievements are relative and a number of prob-
lems persist, most of them resulting from the dire condi-
tions in the camps and the protracted exile. In the camps, 
the obvious obstacles to education are related to the cli-
mate, poverty, and lack of teaching resources. The desert 
heat, sand, and strong winds, not to mention the absence 
of electricity, make it difficult to teach or to learn. There 
are always shortages of books, which students often have 
to share, as they do desks in crowded classrooms. Schools 
lack basic facilities, such as libraries, computers, labs, and 
playgrounds.
Other problems pertain to the outsourcing of education, 
that is, when students in grade six or seven have to leave the 
camps to study elsewhere, where they often are confronted 
with new curricula, academic standards, and language of 
instruction. For example, in Algeria, the academic stan-
dards are higher, and French is the second language taught 
in schools, so many Sahrawi students fail the language sub-
ject and anything else taught in French. Describing some 
of the problems, Bueta, a teacher for some years in SADR’s 
elementary schools, observed:
Most (teachers) do not have the necessary skills … and are them-
selves graduates maybe of only grade nine … also … here students 
begin studying Spanish from grade three to six, then they are sent 
to Algeria, where the program is mainly French … For example, 
I studied … in Libya where … they taught us some English. Then 
we were sent to Algeria, there it was French, which we did not 
know.38
However, in Arab countries, students find it easier to adapt 
than in Cuba, as they share language and religion (Islam) 
with the host society. In Cuba, where thousands of Sahrawis 
have been educated, the problems are different and are 
mainly about adapting to a different cultural environment 
and being unable to afford travel costs to return to the 
camps during summer holidays. Therefore, students have to 
adjust when they first arrive in Cuba, and upon their return 
to the camps following a long absence.39 The situation for 
Sahrawi students, who were poor to begin with, was exacer-
bated when the Soviet Union collapsed, resulting in aus-
terity measures and economic hardships for Sahrawis and 
Cubans in general.
Despite the difficulties, SADR’s successes in the area of 
education are exceptional: the illiteracy rate prior to 1975 
was over 95 per cent, whereas today over 95 per cent are liter-
ate, advancing the cause of self-reliance. There are thousands 
of Sahrawi graduates today with diverse skills and profes-
sions, including doctors, nurses, engineers, teachers, social 
scientists, geologists, etc. In addition, SADR’s education pro-
gram played a fundamental role in consolidating national 
belonging and the new “traditions of citizenship.”
Education, Citizenship, and National Belonging
SADR’s Program of National Action expressed its ideology 
and social philosophy for the new imagined community. 
This is how Abdati, a Sahrawi in his late forties, explained 
the changes:
The new basis of association was belonging to Western Sahara … 
The freeg acquired a political and national definition encouraged 
by the efforts of the Polisario to raise a new national conscious-
ness and ways of relating to society.40
Administrative divisions, institutions and institutional laws 
and regulations, registration procedures and passports, the 
demarcation of public spaces, national celebrations and 
commemorations, etc. rendered concrete an abstract con-
cept of citizenship in daily life. In time, Sahrawi refugees 
could imagine what their rights and responsibilities would 
be like upon repatriation, and they yearned for an independ-
ent nation-state or dawlah mustaqellah . The everyday inter-
actions among Sahrawis in the wilayaat and between the 
citizens and the state, which Sharma and Gupta describe as 
the mundane everyday activities and routines,41 generated 
what Khatri Addu, the governor of Smara, dubbed “new 
traditions of citizenship,” which are:
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Something concrete practiced in the field; citizenship is in the way 
a person’s life is organized, so they (Sahrawi refugees) deal with 
activities and concerns within the framework of well-known and 
specific administrative ways. For example, education: a child goes 
to school at a certain age … there are rules, directives and sys-
tems … We are citizens who are born in Algerian territory, but we 
are independent of the Algerian administrative institutions. We 
have our own institutions, we are a distinctive state.42
In the sphere of education, the modernist vision is 
reflected in school textbooks, discipline, daily schedules, 
and standards for failure or success, representing a rad-
ical departure from the katateeb and the oral tradition. 
Moreover, the Sahrawi Ministry of Education introduced 
a number of textbooks, which represent the embryo of the 
written national history and new ways of remembering and 
forgetting. As Edward Said rightly observed, “what one 
remembers of the past and how one remembers it … deter-
mines how one sees the future.”43 The school textbooks 
encourage loyalty to the nation; praise the revolution, its 
martyrs, and heroes; and suppress the memory of tribes and 
especially old tribal feuds. One such text assigned to grade 
six exposes students to their history as one of anti-colonial 
struggle. The book concludes with lessons learned, such 
as the lesson that Sahrawis must rely on themselves, and 
quotes a Koranic verse that says, “God helps those who help 
themselves.”44 The grade six history book interestingly uses 
two non-Sahrawi sources and importantly does not refer to 
tribes.
The processes entrenching Sahrawi citizenship have 
blurred the boundaries between the “refugee” and the “cit-
izen.” More specifically, the Sahrawi practices of citizenship 
constantly dislodge the “refugee” status, especially because 
dependency on humanitarian aid is contingent on SADR’s 
mediation. It is perhaps more appropriate to talk of the 
citizen-refugees and not the refugee-citizens. Deferring 
the category “refugee” signals the intentional precedence 
of citizenship and political identity by Sahrawis over the 
“refugee” in their lives. Thus, despite their marginality, in 
their “zones of unpredictability”—to adapt the phrase from 
Tsing’s work—Sahrawis rearticulate, enliven, and rearrange 
the social, legal, and political categories that peripheralize 
their existence.45 The consequences of implementing the 
Sahrawi national project at the very least have rendered 
it difficult to conceptualize the citizen and the refugee as 
binary opposites.
Gramsci’s notion that the state rules not only by coercion, 
but also by harnessing consent in civil society, including 
educational institutions,46 applies in the Sahrawi case, but 
with some qualifications. First and foremost, SADR does not 
have the institutional power of sovereign states, but has an 
ambiguous status: it is a state-in-the-making awaiting trans-
portation to national territory, and remains trapped in the 
national liberation stage. Thus, SADR’s existence, aims, and 
practices, as reflected in its education strategy, programs, 
and curriculum, all imbued with the ideals of national lib-
eration and sacrifice for the collective cause, challenge or 
are “counter-hegemonic” to Moroccan domination and its 
rejection of the Sahrawi right to self-determination.
Secondly, education at higher levels is outsourced and 
SADR does not control the curriculum in other countries. 
Nonetheless, students abroad do not fall completely outside 
its purview. SADR sends adult “guides” or mushrifeen to 
accompany each group of students for the duration of their 
studies (this does not apply to students enrolled in universi-
ties). The mushrifeen stand for parent, academic coach, and 
political activist, ensuring students respect the laws and 
regulations of the host state and those of SADR. They meet 
with students regularly, and with varying degrees of suc-
cess teach them the Hassaniyya dialect, Islam, and the his-
tory of the Sahrawi struggle, including SADR’s Program of 
National Action. Al-Mamoun, in his mid-thirties, explained 
the role of the mushrifeen when he was in school in Libya:
We as Sahrawi had our own local committees and learning cir-
cles where we studied … the Program of National Action, we 
learned these principles … such as sacrifice, revolutionary work, 
our history, traditions … etc. Thus, we were always attached to our 
identity.47
Notwithstanding what the mushrifeen and students actually 
did or how they behaved, the idea that they should act 
properly because they are representatives of the whole (the 
nation) was deeply engrained.48
Upon graduation most students return to the camps. 
During the war period, their paramount purpose was to 
volunteer in SADR’s programs or to join the fighters at the 
front. They did not regard education as a private invest-
ment, rather, as a tool to serve the collective endeavour. In 
the years following the ceasefire, however, the balance tilted 
the other way, whereby individuals sought education as an 
asset or cultural capital to facilitate upward social mobility. 
Exemplifying the spirit that dominated during the war per-
iod, Aminatu, a Sahrawi woman I met in 2005 in Madrid, 
explained:
While in Russia [where she studied], I did not speak the 
Hassaniyya dialect … When I returned to the camps [in the late 
1980s] it was … shocking having lived some eleven years away … 
However, my difficulty had more to do with the misery that I saw 
around me, the suffering of my family and the Sahrawi refugees. 
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This reinforced my political beliefs and my Sahrawi identity … I 
re-learned Hassaniyya.49
Upon first returning, peers maintain their close friendships, 
but they quickly discover they are being “re-socialized” into 
“Sahrawi ways,” a process involving “shedding” what are 
viewed as acquired customs and mannerisms. Returnees 
are expected to relearn Hassaniyya, to marry a Sahrawi, 
to wear the melhafa (a cloth wrapped around the body) if 
female, to respect elders, and a host of other customs con-
sidered specifically Sahrawi. The “Cubanos”—as those who 
study in Cuba are sometimes called—are considered the 
most in need of such resocialization.50 But the open spatial 
arrangements in the camps where people constantly “drop 
in” to visit different Khaimas (tents/families) and dynamic 
daily interactions are conducive to attune returnees to the 
rhythm and fabric of camp life, and at least help them to 
publicly avoid transgressing sensibilities. Over time, the 
networks of peers entwine with others, a process which 
constantly injects new ideas and ways of being, enriching 
cultural reproduction and changing debates as to what con-
stitutes “Sahrawi culture.”
However, neither SADR nor the graduates had expected 
their exile to turn into a lethargic hiatus and prolonged state 
of exile. During one of my early visits, I met a Sahrawi man 
in his late thirties who had graduated as a captain for mer-
chant vessels. I found this a bit odd when all around us was 
a sea of sand rather than water. When I inquired into his 
choice, he noted that he had mistakenly assumed Sahrawis 
would be returning soon and that he had hoped to use his 
skills in the Atlantic Ocean. But he never voted, returned, 
or sailed.
Education and the “State in/of Limbo” in an Era of 
Infitah and Intifada
Dr. Sid is a successful Sahrawi dentist based in Madrid. He 
was about seven years old when he fled the war with his 
family to Algeria. He completed elementary and prepara-
tory levels in Libya and was about to start secondary educa-
tion when the Libyan government changed its policy, for-
cing him to complete his education in Algeria. In 1986, he 
travelled to the Soviet Union, where he acquired a university 
degree in dentistry. He returned to the camps in 1992 and 
volunteered in SADR’s Public Health department for four 
years, still hoping that the referendum would take place. 
When it didn’t he left the camps. When asked why he left, 
he explained:
I did not leave the camps in any final way. In the camps, I still 
have my mother, my sisters, relatives, etc., they live in 27 February. 
In any case, I owe my education and all what I have now to the 
camps and the Sahrawi state … I hope Western Sahara will get its 
independence … but the only solution now is to go back to war. 
The negotiations have failed.51
In contrast, Ahmad, in his mid-thirties, did not complete 
his education in order to join the SPLA during the war. 
Following the ceasefire he returned from the frontlines 
to the camps, and when I interviewed him, it was clear he 
regretted not completing his education, as he noted:
Sometimes I do (regret it), especially now in a situation of “neither 
war, nor peace”, and at a time when I need to make a living, some-
times I regret not completing my education.52
Dr. Sid’s trajectory and Ahmad’s reflections on his past 
capture the changes and views that have unfolded since the 
ceasefire. As was the case with Palestinian refugees, Sahrawi 
who fled the war did not initially imagine that their tempor-
ary situation would in time acquire features of a permanent 
exile. The referendum became like a desert mirage, loom-
ing in the distance but never reached. As their hopes to 
return swung high and low, and the months turned into 
years and decades, new generations with different experi-
ences and educational levels were born and raised in the 
camps. Al-Salek, a Sahrawi who had participated in the war, 
described the generational differences as follows:
The older ‘authentic’ generation al-jeel al-aseel faced … discrimin-
ation under Spanish rule … jeel al-thawra, the second generation 
of the revolution … carried out the armed struggle … we felt 
what is the use of education without a Homeland? As for the third 
generation, they also suffer, mainly from waiting and waiting—
they are frustrated. But there is a factor that all generations agree 
upon … We all are ready to leave everything for our homeland.53
The strategic objective to utilize the skilled human resour-
ces in an independent Western Sahara remained unfulfilled. 
Yet, the number of educated graduates and returnees con-
tinued to increase, many without an avenue for applying 
what they had learned and without gainful employment. 
They complained that their lives were suspended and as 
many expressed it, wasted “drinking tea” or ntayyu . The 
political impasse exacerbated the situation and frustration 
led to growing criticism against SADR’s policy to continue 
the “peaceful” diplomatic track to resolve the conflict. The 
mounting tensions placed SADR in an unenviable position: 
how to deal with the social and economic needs of a grow-
ing educated population with little resources, and maintain 
collective national mobilization in the context of a ceasefire 
and an uncertain political future.54
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Both refugees and SADR had to adapt to a changing world 
and the political deadlock. Many graduates, of whom there 
was now a surplus, turned their attention to their livelihood 
needs and aspired for upward social mobility. A number of 
them put away their degrees and set up a profitable venture, 
such as a shop in the informal market. For others the option 
was to leave the camps to seek paid employment in Spain or 
elsewhere. These changes were also prompted by the return 
of many men from the battlefront to the wilayaat, which 
in many cases provoked gender tensions. Women who were 
willing to carry responsibilities within the domestic and 
public spheres, usually quietly, single-handedly, and with 
little resources, when their men were fighting were not will-
ing to put up with men hanging around drinking tea during 
the ceasefire.55
Following the ceasefire, small shops selling food, clothes, 
household items, and mechanics and repair shops sprouted 
rapidly in camps. The growth was exponential, hand-in-
hand with the expansion of transnational political, social, 
and economic networks. Merchandise from Algeria, 
Mauritania, and countries like China and Korea filled the 
markets.56 Television sets, mobile phones, second-hand 
vehicles, and the use of the Internet and video cameras 
became harbingers of what older generations of Sahrawis 
labelled with a touch of irony as the symbols of al-infitah or 
perestroika, referring to the invasion of commodities, new 
consumption habits, and the slow departure from revolu-
tionary principles.
SADR was compelled to adapt. Bending with the chan-
ges, it relaxed its strict centralized policies and operations, 
handing back to families some of the decision-making 
powers relating to education, marriage, and health, which 
it had monopolized during the war years. For example, 
SADR discontinued the imposition of a standard amount 
of dowry/bride price paid to the newlyweds,57 and turned 
a blind eye in cases when students dropped out of school. 
Explaining the changes, Ibrahim, a Sahrawi official working 
in Rabouni, observed:
In my view this is a natural development of society. First … the 
Polisario played a … role in convincing people that education 
is important … In the next stage, the families insisted that their 
children acquire education. Secondly, in the beginning most 
people needed economic assistance … When people became a bit 
more economically independent, they felt that maybe they should 
be able to make more independent decisions.58
The global shifts and political context reconfigured the 
relationship between the public and private domains, and 
SADR’s areas of authority and intervention. However, these 
changes did not necessarily threaten SADR’s national 
project; the informal economic sector, for example, helped 
alleviate some of its responsibility to secure livelihood needs. 
However, the transformations also meant an increase in 
socio-economic inequalities in the camps, away from the 
revolutionary ideals of “equal distribution.” Mundy pro-
poses that these changes did not imperil the national pro-
ject, but “normalized society”: markets, he opines, produce 
citizens no less than popular committees. 59 Similarly, my 
research in Palestinian refugee camps showed that in the 
context of national liberation, upward socio-economic 
mobility and attention to livelihood needs do not necessar-
ily lead to political compromise.
SADR also used technological developments helped by 
its educated generations, to publicize its political program 
and garner support. In the summer of 2009 during my visit, 
SADR inaugurated the first Sahrawi television broadcast-
ing service. It also developed its institutions and relation-
ships with a number of countries, obtaining recognition 
from Kenya, for example, and during my visit it hosted a 
Venezuelan delegation, an indication that bilateral relations 
were being developed.
In May 2005 an Intifada or uprising erupted in the 
Moroccan-occupied territories, invigorating national-
ist sentiments and reinforcing links between the Sahrawi 
population within and outside Western Sahara. This 
has some parallels with the Palestinian case, where the 
Palestinian Intifada in 1989 shifted the focus of the struggle 
to the occupied territories. Similarly, the Sahrawi Intifada 
turned attention to the Moroccan-occupied territories. 
Significantly, the May demonstrations in the city of al-
Ayoun were dubbed the “independence protests,” symbol-
ized by raising the SADR flag and by the slogan “la badeel 
la badeel, ‘an taqreer al maseer,” meaning “no alternative to 
self-determination.” On 8 November 2010 another Sahrawi 
protest was violently dismantled by the Moroccan security 
forces in the Gdeim Izik camp consisting of thousands of 
tents erected by Sahrawis in al-Ayoun.60 Instantaneously, 
Internet links to video recordings of mass demonstrations 
and photographs of victims of Moroccan repression spread 
across cyberspace. The violence in the occupied territories 
provoked the young educated youth in the wilayaat to stage 
what was described as “almost a rebellion” against SADR’s 
strategy of peaceful negotiations, urging their leaders to 
resume the fighting.61
Conclusion
In contemporary theories, the refugee has emerged as a 
metaphor for the post-modern condition, providing mod-
els of dispersed senses of personhood, in opposition to the 
models of fixity and orders of modern society.62 However, 
the historical and political contexts remain critical when 
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applying theoretical concepts. The case of the Western 
Sahara refugees is that of incomplete decolonization, 
wherein SADR is a manifestation of a nationalism with a 
trajectory in the anti-colonial struggles of the twentieth 
century. Therefore, SADR’s aim to achieve sovereignty in 
Western Sahara is not sui generis reactionary politics or a 
conservative agenda, especially in the current global struc-
tures and relations of power, in which Morocco sits com-
fortably on the side of the US, the largest imperial power. 
In contrast, SADR is an incomplete and vulnerable polity 
with unstable formations. Thus, we should be cautious in 
practicing our skills in deconstruction of “identity politics” 
and the nation-state, lest we play into the hands of powerful 
actors against the claims of the oppressed.63
Thus there are many analytical challenges and political 
considerations that bear on this particular case, not sim-
ply in writing about it, but also in tracing the processes 
involved in the contemporary context of shifting social and 
economic formations, global political alliances, and new 
forms of struggle expressed in the practices and language 
of the age.
SADR’s national institutions provide a model which 
could be showcased not only to its refugee-constituents, but 
also to the international community. For SADR, the achieve-
ments brought about through education show not only that 
they are deserving of self-determination, but that their edu-
cated human resources could run the operations and insti-
tutions of an independent Western Sahara. The argument, 
as Khatri Addu explained when I interviewed him in the 
wilaya of Smara is: “if we could administer a nation-state in 
the harsh desert environment with very little resources, we 
can manage even more effectively with resources and in our 
own territory.”64 SADR succeeded in creating an educated 
population in exile and thus far has adapted to changing 
global configurations, but the ceasefire has become increas-
ingly fragile. It is difficult to predict the future, but the shift-
ing sands of the Sahara might unexpectedly draw students 
and graduates back to the battle fronts.65
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